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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Western understanding of property has traditionally followed the 
Blackstonian conception of: 
 
…that sole and despotic dominium which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of 
the right of any other individual in the universe.1  
 
Whilst this infamous quote is often cited out of context, the right to 
exclude others is still recognised as the hallmark of the property rights 
enjoyed by a titleholder.  
Communal property arrangements are in sharp decline, especially in 
capitalist economies. Social and economic policy favour those who use by 
taking resources and excluding others, as opposed to those who use a 
resource whilst sharing it. By using a number of models (such as the tragedy 
of the commons, the prisoner’s dilemma or the logic of collective action),2 
social scientists, economists and lawyers have all argued for the 
privatisation of natural resources at the expense of common-property 
regimes. Common-property suffers a stigmatisation; it is often considered 
an arrangement that is marred by the mismanagement of resources, 
confined to the developing world and intrinsically linked to poverty. 3 
Consequently, very little provision is made in English law for communal 
property arrangements, and there is no real legal mechanism that can 
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adequately accommodate this alternative method of property holding.4 The 
trust and the corporate form can be manipulated to enable communities to 
control and hold title to land, but are not mechanisms that are designed or 
inherently suited to such a purpose. Even newer initiatives, such as 
community land trusts,5 are bound to the existing legal forms and have not 
developed new title holding mechanisms in favour of the community, thus 
limiting their impact in furthering the communal property cause. 
Notwithstanding the prevalent trend of the privatisation of resources, 
our legal doctrine strongly suggests that some kinds of property should not 
be exclusively private; but rather should be open to the public or subject to 
the jus publicum.6 Indeed, it has also been argued that communal resource 
use is a “versatile and endemic phenomenon, not a relic of past or primitive 
societies”.7 Empirical studies of communal resources have demonstrated 
that common-property arrangements can, and do, survive. Moreover, new 
de facto common-property arrangements are arising, and yet there is an 
inadequate legal framework in practice to recognise them. Modern 
commons scholarship is trying to reverse the marginalisation of common-
property arrangements, the first step of which is to justify these 
arrangements, as this article aims to do.  
This two-part article seeks to expose the imbalance between communal 
and private property arrangements by justifying communal property claims 
using a theory that is frequently invoked to justify private property: the 
personality theory of property. It is argued that if a community of users can 
establish a claim within the personhood perspective, that claim should be 
treated with the same respect as the private property claim founded through 
the same mechanism. Where competing claims to natural resources 
(specifically land) exist, it should not always be the private property claim 
of an individual landowner that takes priority when the other claimant is a 
community of users. If both claims can be justified through the same 
mechanism, both should be treated with equal weight and consideration.  
Part II of this instalment examines the personality theory of property as 
traditionally applied to justify private property claims, and suggests that 
this justificatory framework could, in theory, be applied to a communal 
claim. Part III acknowledges that the personhood claim cannot be applied 
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to simply any group to substantiate a successful property claim, and 
examines the requisite group characteristics that allow the application of 
the theory. The second instalment of this two-part article will then apply 
the personality theory of property to the limited number of community 
claims that are recognised in English law. It will be shown that the 
personality theory of property is not yet operative in the community 
context, and does not protect community entitlement in the way that it 
protects the entitlement of private individuals. The second instalment also 
explores why community entitlement to property fails to adhere to the 
personality theory, and points to the inconsistency between the nature of 
the community claim and the dominant narrative in property discourse. 
Finally, it will be suggested that whilst recent political initiatives purport to 
have given greater weight to community entitlements to property, this is in 
fact a ruse. The outcome of the policies aimed at recognising the 
community claim is little more than a perpetuation of the preference for 
private property initiatives.   
The reluctant conclusion of these papers is that a community of users 
cannot establish an entitlement to the resource that they use through the 
personality theory of property. Whilst in theory claims of a community 
should be respected in the same way as claims of individuals under the 
personhood perspective, this is impossible as long as the dominant narrative 
of property is that of the self-interested individual. The English legal system 
does not understand the nature of communal claims, and all attempts to 
introduce policies and mechanisms that recognise and accommodate 
community claims to land have proved ineffective. Allocation of, and 
entitlement to, natural resources not only relies on the dominant property 
narrative, but also the political climate in which the narrative is developed. 
The political climate is such that promoting community entitlement to 
property is not advantageous to realising the economic aims of the 
government, which, in light of the recent economic downturn, can only 
really favour the instrumental and fungible property claim.  
 
2. THE PERSONALITY THEORY OF PROPERTY 
 
Instinctive impulse drives us to collect property; and the collections 
thus made become, with different degrees of intimacy, parts of our 
empirical selves.8 
 
The personality theory of property, also referred to as property and 
personhood (the terms are used interchangeably), is traditionally used to 
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justify private property claims. The essence of the theory is that an 
individual embodies himself or herself in the external world by projecting 
their will into external unoccupied objects. The property becomes bound 
up with their personality, and is a constitutive part of their personhood. This 
embodiment of will justifies the individual having dominium over the 
property, as it is to be treated as part of his or her empirical self. For another 
to use the property would be an invasion of bodily integrity, and therefore 
the entitlement of the individual invoking the personhood claim should be 
protected by rules prohibiting such trespass. Therefore, the personality 
theory of property extends the assault analogy by extending its scope to 
invasions of bodily integrity that may occur once personhood-constituting 
claims to property are recognised.9 
 
Hegelian Model 
 
The origins of the personality theory of property can be found in the 
philosophical scholarship of Hegel, most notably in his seminal text, 
Philosophy of Right. In Hegel’s personality theory an individual embodies 
his personality in property by projecting and externalising his personality 
into previously unoccupied objects. To embody one’s personality in an 
external object one must use and take possession of the item.10 This in turn 
precludes a second man taking possession of something that is already the 
property of another,11 and the first possessor will be considered the true 
owner, as there is no property left for another man to take.12  Waldron 
describes the embodiment of will as a two way process: first the object is 
effected by your will, and second, as a result of that effect, it makes certain 
uses of that object possible that otherwise would not have been possible.13 
Once an individual has embodied their will in the external object, that 
object becomes part of their person, in the same way that their physical 
form is constitutive of their person; this is the justification for the 
acquisition of property by an individual. However, Hegel’s personality 
theory does not concentrate solely on the individual, and does recognise a 
role for the group or community; this role is not equivalent to the role of 
the individual and their will, but it is crucial to establishing a personhood 
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claim. There are three important references to the community in Hegel’s 
work. 
First, Hegel requires the embodiment of a person’s will in an external 
object to be recognisable by others, and the presence of other human beings 
in the world is essential for that recognition. For a person to have something 
as his or her property, there must be those in the world who do not have 
that item as their property, and who can recognise the property claim of 
someone else.14 Unless the individual claiming the object to be theirs is 
doing so in the context of the group, there is no value or substance to the 
claim, as the right to the property has no correlative duty.  
Second, Hegel incompletely introduces the notion of autonomous 
groups, and gives particular attention to the family unit and their property 
relationships.15 He treats the family in the same way as an individual by 
asserting that the family only has an external existence through property; 
“and it is only when this property takes the form of capital that it becomes 
the embodiment of the substantial personality of the family.”16 The desires 
and needs of particular individuals in the family unit are transformed into 
the care for common possessions. Hegel explains that whilst each member 
of the family has no property that he can call his own, he has a right to the 
common stock.  
The idea that family members share in a common stock initially looks 
appealing to the aim of this article: applying the personality theory of 
property to the communal claim. If the group or community that is seeking 
to establish an entitlement to property can be considered as analogous to 
the family unit, it seems that it is possible to assert that the community has 
no external existence until they embody their will in property. This 
embodiment will be possible if each member of the community is willing 
to give up their individual entitlement in favour of a share in the common 
stock held by the community unit. However, this initial reading is flawed 
and unhelpful. Hegel requires that the husband, as the head of the family, 
must represent the legal entity and that his powers of administration may 
clash with the right of the individual family members to the common stock. 
This clash could eventually lead to ‘partition’ and ‘contingency’.17 
Therefore, Hegel’s autonomous family group does not advance the case 
for the recognition of communal property-holding any further. It seems 
difficult to understand the family unit as a communal holding mechanism 
as long as the administration of the property can only be conducted by one 
of those persons entitled to the common stock. One of the primary problems 
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with community title is that it is not recognised in law, and even those that 
are recognised do not have the characteristics of a true communal regime. 
They invariably rely on the right of one person to administer the property 
and represent the other members of the community, rather than recognising 
a collective entitlement to manage and administer the property. This 
concept of communal-holding bears some resemblance to a trust 
relationship: the individual with the power of administration holds the 
common stock on trust and manages it for the benefit of the beneficiaries, 
who are the members of the family unit. Therefore, it seems that Hegel’s 
conception of the family is little more than a trust-like relationship, and 
advances the possibility of applying the personality theory of property to 
communal claims no further. Only if the notion of the autonomous group is 
further developed will it be possible that the property and personhood claim 
could be used to substantiate a community entitlement to property. 
Finally, Hegel explicitly cautions that individual property rights cannot 
prevail over demands that may be made for the realisation or maintenance 
of a genuine ethical community or state.18 He also goes further by saying 
that the state may cancel property rights in exceptional circumstances. 
However, he also renders this unusual, as the state has actively sought to 
promote private property as “no community has so good a right to property 
as a person has”.19 Therefore, in this instance, the role and entitlement of 
the community seems to be subordinate to the property of individuals, 
unless exceptional circumstances prevail. 
 
Neo-Hegelian Conceptions: Personal and Fungible Property Claims 
 
Hegel’s work has been examined and reformulated in many of the texts 
that are referenced throughout this article. One of the most notable 
contributions to this Neo-Hegelian restatement is in the work of Professor 
Radin, who notes that “[a]lmost any theory of private property can be 
referred to some notion of personhood”.20 She frames her inquiry as being 
an exploration as to how the personhood perspective can help resolve 
specific disputes between rival claimants. Therefore, Radin’s work could 
be vitally important to the adjudication of disputes between an individual 
and a community that lay claim to the same resource. 
Both Radin and Hegel proceed from the same basic premise: that to 
achieve proper self-development an individual needs to control resources 
in the external environment. Yet, despite being a species of the same theory, 
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the personhood perspectives put forward by Hegel and Radin differ in a 
number of ways. The most crucial of these differences is the conception of 
the ‘person’ that each is deploying. As far as Hegel’s personhood 
perspective is concerned, a person is not fully constituted and capable of 
being a person until they have property and control over resources in the 
external environment. Therefore Hegel’s person is akin to the conception 
of the person that is prevalent in the philosophy of Kant. Hegel’s person is 
an autonomous being that is capable of holding rights, and thus does not 
have any individuating characteristics until these rights are acquired. On 
the contrary, Radin adopts a view of the person that does not eliminate their 
individuating characteristics. Her person is already fully formed and 
constituted when he projects his personality into the world, and the property 
relationship allows the individual to express himself in the outside world, 
rather than attain status as a person.  
Using this conception of the person, Radin pursues what she labels as 
the ‘intuitive view’ of property and personhood, which is wholly subjective. 
She argues that most people possess objects that they feel are almost part 
of themselves because they “constitute ourselves as continuing personal 
entities in the world”.21 To measure the strength of the connection between 
an individual and the objects that they possess Radin suggests the metric to 
be the level of pain that would be incurred should the individual be deprived 
of that object. On this measurement, if the pain caused by the loss of the 
object cannot be alleviated by the replacement of the object, it is likely that 
the object is bound up with the holder and is closely related to their 
personhood. The example that Radin provides is that of a wedding ring, to 
which the wearer would attribute a sentimental value that could not be 
replicated by a replacement ring or through substitution for monetary value. 
If, however, the wedding ring were stolen from a jeweller, it is likely that a 
replacement ring or the monetary value of the ring would be a sufficient 
remedy to alleviate the pain caused by its loss. Unless there are special 
circumstances it seems a safe presumption that the ring has no sentimental 
value to the jeweller, who views the ring as profit. Radin has respectively 
labelled the claim of the wearer of the ring and the jeweller as personal and 
fungible property claims. She presents these two claims in the form of a 
dichotomy, although she does also acknowledge that objects may shift 
between the categories of personal and fungible property, or they may fall 
out of the categories of property altogether.22 
Radin’s view is subjective in the sense that the objects that may be 
bound up with individuals, through the metric of the pain incurred on their 
loss, will vary greatly from person to person. One individual may view their 
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Rolex as a financial investment, which could be replaced by a watch of the 
same specification and vintage (or its monetary value), whereas others may 
have an attachment to their Rolex as a gift or family heirloom. Similarly, 
some individuals may feel a deep attachment to items that others view as 
absurd or odd, but the pain that would be caused by the loss of these items 
qualifies them as closely related to the personhood of the individual. It is 
unclear where the limits of the tolerance for personal-property claims in the 
subjective view are. There must be a dividing line between those claims 
that are valid and acceptable, and those that are simply fetishes that are not, 
or arguably should not, be closely linked to personhood. All personhood 
claims are based on the preferences of individuals, but there must be 
objective criteria that differentiate between good and bad identification 
with external objects.23  
Once a valid connection to an external object can be substantiated, the 
personality theory of property suggests that the property claims that are 
constitutive of personhood have a stronger moral claim than property 
claims that have an instrumental purpose. In short, personal claims to 
property should be protected ‘against invasion by government and against 
cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims of other people’.24 
Personal-property claims should take priority over fungible property 
claims, even when the fungible property claim is established first in time. 
This general rule may be rebutted in exceptional circumstances where the 
property claim can be proven not to be personal, or where is can be deemed 
not to be so personal as to outweigh the importance of the government 
taking the object over which the claim is made for a particular social 
purpose.25 If the latter circumstance occurs, it is likely that the level of 
compensation awarded for the deprivation of the property would reflect the 
personal nature of the property claim (notwithstanding the fact that the 
personal claim is unlikely to be adequately compensated through the mode 
of damages).  
At first glance the rule that personal property claims should take priority 
over fungible claims, even where that fungible claim is established first in 
time, seems to contradict Hegel’s notion that once property has been 
occupied there is no property left for another man to take. If a property 
claim can be displaced by a competing property claim it suggests that there 
was residual property available for occupation, the occupation of which can 
eventually result in the total displacement of the existing fungible claim. 
However, on a closer reading, the combined effect of Radin and Hegel 
seems only to be that the fungible claim should not be protected against a 
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subsequent personal claim; only existing personal claims should be 
protected against subsequent claims (whether personal or fungible), 
whereas fungible claims will only be protected against subsequent fungible 
claims. The fungible claim does not give rise to the same entitlement as a 
personal claim. The personal claim precludes another from claiming an 
entitlement to the property, as there would be no property left for another 
man to take once that property is constitutive of the personhood of the first 
occupant. Conversely, fungible claims can always be displaced where an 
individual embodies their will in the object and links it to their personhood, 
regardless of whether the fungible claimant was the first occupant or not. 
Therefore, the personality theory of property is normative, insofar as it 
suggests that property constitutive of personhood is worthier of protection 
than other property claims, and that personal-property claims give rise to a 
stronger entitlement.  
The inquiry in this article has adopted the personal/fungible dichotomy 
because its purpose is to adjudicate between competing claims to the same 
resource. In the context of the wedding ring example above, if there were a 
conflict between the claims of the wearer and the jeweller, the claim of the 
wearer would take priority, as their claim is a personal one. The ring is 
bound up with the personhood of the wearer, whereas the jeweller has only 
an instrumental value for the ring, rendering his claim fungible. The same 
reasoning applies to natural resources, such as land. For example: if person 
A builds their home on a plot of land (we will assume for the moment that 
this is done lawfully), and the interest that person B holds in the land is 
purely financial (such as being the landowner), and Person B seeks to use 
the land in a way that is inconsistent with A’s home being on the land (sale 
or development with the intention of making financial gain etc.), the claim 
of person A should prevail, unless there are exceptional circumstances. 
Person A has a personal claim over the land; the land is the site of their 
home to which they have an attachment. It is unlikely that a replacement 
home will hold the same value for Person A as their present home does. 
This home has fostered relationships, memories and sentiment that a 
replacement house would not have. On the contrary, the landowner who 
holds a purely financial interest is asserting a fungible property claim only 
as he attributes an instrumental value to the land. Furthermore, Person B 
would, in this scenario, also be satisfied with replacement land or monetary 
compensation on the loss of the land. In a direct clash between the two, the 
personal claim has the greater moral value, and should be protected. Person 
B should be prevented in engaging in the use that is inconsistent with the 
claim of person A. 
The personhood perspective does not exist only in the hypothetical 
instance, nor does it only exist at a theoretical level. There are many legal 
doctrines that, whilst they are not labelled as such, either expressly or 
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implicitly acknowledge the personal-property claim as worthy of protection 
over those claims that are fungible. For example, allowing individuals to 
acquire rights over land by prescription, and allowing the acquisition of title 
by virtue of long use through adverse possession, both acknowledge that 
those who use the land for a sustained period bind themselves with the land 
in such a way that gives rise to a property claim. This property claim often 
takes the form of a personal-property claim,26 and in the case of adverse 
possession may even lead to the fungible claimant losing title to the land 
altogether. Another example can be found in the overriding interest of 
persons in actual occupation.27 The overriding interest protects unregistered 
interests in the land, provided those rights are coupled with occupation of 
the land, even in the presence of a conflicting claim. If the individual 
occupies the land it is assumed that their personhood is closely linked to 
the land in such a way that the loss of the land cannot be adequately 
compensated through substitution of the land, or provision of monetary 
compensation. They have an entitlement that should be upheld against 
fungible claims of purchasers, or a pre-existing personal claim that should 
take priority over new personal claims that may arise.  
 
Personhood in the Group Context 
 
The contentious element of this project is extending the normative 
principle of favouring personal claims to a conflict concerning the claim of 
a group or community against claim made by a private landowner. The 
personal/fungible dichotomy has rarely, if ever, been analysed outside the 
context of a conflict between two individuals. It is essentially a way of 
justifying a private property claim and allocating a resource or object to one 
person over another. However, it does not seem beyond the realm of logical 
application that, if a group could establish a personal-property claim, it 
should defeat the fungible claim of others. The application of the dichotomy 
and normative principle to this effect would be radical; the group would 
attain new competencies and status, and is not without its difficulties, but it 
is certainly not impossible.  
Some headway has already been made in applying the personhood 
perspective to community claims. For example, Professor Harris suggests 
that the assault analogy actually has more force when discussing the 
concept in the context of community claims to first occupancy. He suggests 
that to take artefacts that are closely identified with the cultural identity of 
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a particular community constitutes a natural wrong. 28  Furthermore, he 
suggests that that analogy is even stronger in the case of land if the 
community is in occupation of the land and relies on its use for economic 
survival, as incompatible uses by newcomers will constitute an attack upon 
the community’s collective integrity. 29  Whilst Harris is not directly 
addressing a group personal-property claim, the personality theory relies 
heavily upon, and indeed extends, the assault analogy that he is discussing. 
Furthermore, there are similarities between the first occupancy rule and the 
personality theory of property that enhance the relevance of Harris’s 
observations in the context of the personality theory of property. The key 
similarity is that once property has been occupied by force of individual 
will, and that claim is personal, there is no property left for another man to 
take. In much the same way, once property has been taken or occupied for 
the first time, the individual engaged in that act of taking has the best title 
to the object.  
Radin does not herself take the additional step of applying the 
personal/fungible dichotomy in the group context. However, similarly to 
Hegel, Radin does indicate that the group has some role in the personality 
theory of property. She briefly revisits Hegel’s assertion that an individual 
can only find self-determination in the context of a group, and notes that 
this may have political consequences for group claims on certain resources 
in the external world. 30  It seems that, for Radin at least, applying the 
personhood perspective to a group claim to protect that group’s entitlement 
is not beyond possibility, although that step is still only in elementary form. 
In the context of eminent domain (compulsory purchase), Radin suggests 
that: 
 
Although the personhood perspective has not yet yielded a general 
limitation on eminent domain, some fragmentary evidence suggests 
that group property rights, if connected with group autonomy or 
association, are given enhanced protection.31 
 
This project seeks to achieve what the neo-Hegelians have yet to do: to 
apply the personal/fungible dichotomy to claims made by groups and 
communities to natural resources, such as land, and to allow those groups 
that succeed in establishing a personal-property claim to defeat any 
competing fungible claims. The application of the theory in this way will 
potentially allow those communities that use land to defeat the claims of 
                                                 
28 Harris (n 9) 216. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Radin (n 20). 
31 Ibid 1006. 
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those who seek to use the same land in a way that is inconsistent with the 
use of the community.  For example, recognising the personal-property 
claim of a community that use land for the purposes of recreation could 
protect these recreational spaces from inconsistent use that is motivated by 
financial purposes, such as development or enclosure. There is currently 
very little legal recognition of community rights to resources, and those 
mechanisms that do exist are tempered by political policy objectives. By 
grounding the community entitlement in a strong theoretical framework, 
such as property and personhood, the chances of achieving legal 
recognition of community claims and entitlement are greatly increased. 
In principle, the application of the personality theory of property to 
community claims seems plausible. However, there are a number of 
difficulties that must be explored. The primary difficulty is the nature and 
conception of the group. At present a group or community does not enjoy 
the same legal and moral status as an individual to whom the theory is 
applied. Groups are inherently different in that they are a collection of wills, 
rather than one single will that is seeking to be embodied in the external 
world; and it is to this problem that the attention of this article will now 
turn. 
 
3. DEFINING THE COMMUNITY 
 
In the attempt to apply the personality theory of property to communal 
claims the initial challenge is to reconceive the role of the group. It is clear 
from the preceding discussion that the group dynamic has some, albeit 
limited, role in the personality theory of property. The settled role of the 
group, which is in effect the society in which the private property-owning 
actors operate, is to act as an audience to the claim of the private 
individual.32  
The present function of the group can therefore be understood by using 
a centuries-old puzzle; if a tree falls in the woods and there is nobody 
around to hear it fall, would it make a sound? If a private individual 
established and then communicated a private property claim over a natural 
resource, and there was nobody around to receive that communication, 
would the claim still exist? The group in the property claim serves the same 
function as the ear with the falling tree. The falling tree causes a number of 
vibrations in the air, or sound waves. However, ‘sound’ is something within 
human experience, until the vibrations reach a human ear and are 
synthesised, they will only ever be vibrations. The same reasoning applies 
to the property claim: until that claim is communicated to, and understood 
                                                 
32 See also Rose (n 6) chapter one, where the importance of the audience and the 
symbols of possession are discussed. 
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by, the society in which the claimant lives, it has no substance or meaning. 
By receiving the communication and understanding the property claims 
made by others the claim is realised, and the entitlement can be respected 
and observed by the members of society. 
The group or society is, on this conception, little more than a collection 
of self-interested individuals; there is nothing inherently cohesive or group-
like about them. The group does not have a level of collective autonomy 
that elevates it to the status of a right-holder, and which allows the 
personality theory of property to substantiate a property entitlement in their 
favour. The individual members and their property claims exist solely as a 
comparator for the claims of others;33 they allow for the distinction between 
that which is ‘mine’ and ‘thine’, a distinction that, when made and 
understood, gives the private entitlement of one individual real substance. 
The closest that this disparate conception of the group gets to being 
communal is when a number of individuals with similar interests associate 
with one another. However, there is a marked difference between groups in 
which each individual holds a right individually and severally, and a group 
in which the group itself has a right. A group, whose members make the 
same property claim, or hold the same property rights, does not 
automatically lead to a group that itself holds a right. For example, every 
member of a community may hold the benefit of an easement, which they 
exercise in common with other members of the community who also have 
the benefit of an easement that is substantially similar to their own. This 
state of affairs does not mean that the community itself has an easement, 
but rather that the community is comprised of a number of similarly situated 
individuals. Professor McDonald labels this collection of individuals a 
‘class action concept of collective rights’, and he defines the group as a 
“convenient device for advancing the multiple discrete and severable 
interests of similarly interested individuals.”34 
This article seeks to go further than the class action concept of 
collective rights, and seeks to justify the group itself making a property 
claim and holding the consequential property rights. The role of the group 
should be more substantial than just a mechanism advancing the similar 
interests of individuals. As McDonald himself argues:  
 
                                                 
33 It is observed that there must be poverty for there to be private property, however 
the link between those who are propertyless and their ethical status and incomplete 
personhood is unclear, see Waldron (n 13) 377-89. 
34  M McDonald, ‘Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal 
Individualism’ (1991) 4 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 217-18. 
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…class action rights are too thin a model for collective rights. A 
major aim of group rights is to protect interests which are not thus 
severable into individual interests for the rights in question benefit 
the group itself by providing a collective benefit.35 
 
Group Personhood 
 
The conception of the group must be modified for the personality theory 
of property to allow groups themselves to establish personal-property 
claims, something that Hegel did not do, and that the neo-Hegelian scholars 
have yet fully to do. In order to use the personality theory to justify the 
recognition of communal property rights the group, as a collective, must 
itself be able to make a claim and must be ascribed the same competencies 
and power of the private individual. 
However, the difficulty with considering the group in the same light as 
an individual is that they are inherently different. The personality theory of 
property embodies the will of an individual in an external inanimate object. 
This process is easy to rationalise when it is applied to a private individual 
who has a single identifiable will. Yet, when applied to the group 
dimension, a problem emerges. The group contains a number of 
individuals, each with their own will. It is likely, if not inevitable, that these 
individual wills will in some way be inconsistent with one another. 
Therefore, the first task is to organise disparate individuals into a united 
group. 
In the context of arguing that Hegel provides a rights-based, as opposed 
to utilitarian, argument for private property, Professor Waldron suggests 
that Hegel himself addresses this concern. Waldron states: 
 
…Hegel did not believe that there was ultimately any distinction 
between the collective interests of a community and the individual 
interests of the members of that community. That the goals of the 
community to which he belongs should be pursued and realised- 
that is the ultimate interest of each individual.36  
 
This interpretation does not leave room for inconsistencies or 
incompatibility in the wills of the individual members of the community. 
By virtue of belonging to the community every member has the common 
will of pursuing the interests of the community. However, Waldron’s 
statement presupposes that the community has an identified goal that it 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Waldron (n 13) 347. 
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seeks to pursue, which in turn transposes itself into the will of the 
individuals belonging to the community. 
Therefore, it seems that Waldron is missing a step, as the group must 
first determine the goals and interests that it wishes to pursue before this 
can be adopted as the interest of the collective. For the community to 
determine the goals that it wishes to pursue there must be some decision-
making process, of which the members of the community consider the 
outcome binding. There must also be some form of governance within the 
community and the ability to police those members of the community who 
diverge from the determined aims. Therefore, a community that is able to 
achieve a united will, and group personhood that can project into the 
external world to establish property claims, must possess characteristics 
that are different from those groups (or society in general) that merely 
facilitate the private property claims of individuals. McDonald supports this 
assertion and argues that  
 
For a group to function as a rights-holder its members must see 
themselves as normatively bound to each other such that each does 
not act simply for herself or himself but each pays her or his part in 
effectuating the shared normative understanding.37 
 
Mutual Self-Interest Commons 
 
In order to deduce the group characteristics that are necessary to 
facilitate the adoption of one collective aim, it is necessary to identify the 
type of common that this two-part article seeks to justify. There are three 
types of common-property regimes: no property, open access and limited 
access. The generic terms ‘common-property’ and ‘communal property’ 
are unhelpfully used to refer to all three. Professor Bromley suggests that 
this interchangeable use of language to describe different circumstances 
and legal relations leaves the progress of understanding these concepts 
impeded. 38  Ironically, even Bromley himself conflates the no property 
regime with open access property, stating that an open access regime refers 
to resources of which there are no property rights, or a resource that is res 
nullius.39  
The definitions that this paper adopts are as follows. A no property 
regime is one where everyone in the world has the freedom, but not a right, 
                                                 
37 McDonald (n 34); see also AM Honoré, ‘Groups, Laws and Obedience’ in AWB 
Simpson (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 1973) 2. 
38 DW Bromley (ed), Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Reality 
(Institute for Contemporary Studies 1992) 3. 
39 Ibid 4. 
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to use the resource. This equates to a Hohfeldian privilege and the 
correlative no-right not to be excluded from the use. In contrast, an open 
access property regime is one where every person has a Hohfeldian right to 
use the resource, and all others have a duty not to exclude those who enjoy 
these rights; the paradigm case of which would be a right of way. A limited 
access regime also hinges on the right-duty correlate, but only those persons 
who are members of a particular community have the right to use the 
resource. It has been argued that the limited access common is the only 
species of common that has any chance of prosperity and of rebutting the 
tragedy of the commons, as the limited community of users is likely to have 
the necessary regulation in place.40   
The group personhood claim seeks to establish a limited access 
common, also referred to as a mutual self-interest common (these terms can 
be used interchangeably). By establishing a group personhood and 
projecting the community personality into the external world, natural 
resources (and specifically land) are subject to the use rights and 
entitlements of the community, who may exclude all those who fall outside 
of the community.  
Professor Rose equates the open access regime with the use rights of 
the ‘unorganised public’, whereas a limited access common used by a 
smaller group or community has a greater resemblance to private 
ownership. 41  The cornerstone of a private property regime is that that 
titleholder must be able to exclude all others from their property. Similarly, 
the community has the right to exclude anyone who is not a member from 
the use of the resource. Indeed it is likely, if not almost certain, that this 
right to exclude is what allows mutual self-interest commons to survive, as 
will be discussed shortly. If this assertion by Rose is in fact true, then it 
seems that a limited access common may not be a true ‘common-property’ 
regime at all, but rather a sub-species of private property that recognises the 
legal entitlement of more than four persons.42  
However, whilst the small user group of a limited access common may 
well resemble private ownership, there is a key distinguishing factor; the 
alienability of communal property is markedly different to that of privately 
owned property. 
The rights of the user in both common-property (used in this sense to 
mean limited access commons) and open access regimes have been 
                                                 
40 Clarke (n 7) 323. 
41 Rose (n 6) 117. 
42 English law permits the legal title of property to be held by four persons or fewer, 
as stipulated by the Law of Property Act 1925, s 34(2), and the rights of any further 
parties will be recognised in equity only. 
 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
33 
extensively examined. In particular, Professor Eggertsson has highlighted 
the differences between the rights of the user in open access commons, and 
those in pure common-property regimes.43 By adopting the spectrum of 
user rights put forward by Professors Ostrom and Schlager, Eggertsson 
compares the differences in entitlements between the two regimes. The 
possible entitlements that exist are:44  
 
1. Authorised access to enjoy non-subtractive benefits 
2. Right to withdraw resource units 
3. Right to manage and improve the asset 
4. Right to exclude others from entering and withdrawing resources 
5. Right to sell or lease the asset 
 
Eggertsson suggests that open access regimes will entitle users to the 
first two incidents, whereas common-property regimes will entitle users to 
the first four.45 Crucially, even a common-property regime will not entitle 
its users to the fifth incidence, as this is what separates common-property 
regimes from all other arrangements that include exclusive rights. True 
common-property is inalienable.  
Eggertsson argues that a joint ownership arrangement that includes the 
power of alienation cannot be a common-property arrangement on the 
definitions given by Ostrom and Schlager.46 Therefore, some of the limited 
mechanisms that are recognised for the joint holding of property, such as 
the company, should not be defined as a common-property arrangement. 
This view is supported by others; for example, Professor Clarke describes 
the corporate form as “inappropriate- although not necessarily unworkable- 
for communal resource holding”. 47  Furthermore, the aforementioned 
distinction between group rights and the class action concept of collective 
rights would, in this context, suggest that the property rights in the 
common-property arrangement should benefit the community as a whole, 
not the individual members of the community. The rights that exist within 
a true common-property arrangement cannot be severed into individual 
interests that can be alienated; the property entitlement exists only as a 
                                                 
43 T Eggertsson, ‘Open Access Versus Common Property’ in TL Anderson, FS 
McChesney (eds), Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law (Princeton 
University Press 2003). 
44  Ibid 74; see Edella Schlager and E Ostrom, ‘Property-Rights Regimes and 
Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis’ (1992) 68 (3) Land Economics 249. 
45 Eggertsson (n 43) 74. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Clarke (n 7) 350. 
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whole, and belongs to the group, not to each and every member of the group 
as an individual.  
One way to explain the inalienability of common-property is to view 
the property arrangement as comparable to a trust arrangement, such as the 
public trust doctrine. However, whilst in the public trust doctrine it is the 
state that holds the property on trust for the use of the general public, in a 
common-property regime the community hold the property on trust for the 
benefit of the present and future members of the community. This 
intergenerational equality of benefit prevents the community from 
alienating the property at the expense of the use of future generations, and 
is the factor that distinguishes the limited access common from private 
ownership. Private property arrangements predominantly focus on the 
freedom of the present right holder. Unless that right holder voluntarily 
undertakes to preserve their property for future generations and their heirs, 
there is no legal obligation to preserve the capital of their property in such 
a way. This theory also seems to attract some implicit approval from 
Ostrom, who suggests that a successful community that establishes a 
limited access common will have an “intricate web of connections among 
participants who share a past and expect to share a future.”48  
Another way to explain the inalienability of common-property falls 
squarely within the application of the personality theory of property to 
communal claims. As Professor Harris notes: 
 
…[a] successful invocation of the personhood-constituting 
argument would not yield full-blooded ownership. In particular, it 
appears incompatible with freedom to transmit.49  
 
The conceptual consequence of allowing transmission of property 
rights that have been established through a personal-property claim is to 
transfer a portion of the claimant’s personhood, which is in fact non-
transferrable.50 Professor Benson supports this contention in his analysis of 
Hegel’s philosophy, where he argues that only things can be alienated, and 
as personality is not a thing, it cannot be alienated. Looking specifically 
towards paragraph 66 of Philosophy of Right, Benson says that “whatever 
constitutes a person’s self-relatedness…whatever belongs to a person’s 
inward, thinking relation to him or to herself, must be treated as 
                                                 
48 A Margalit, ‘Commons and Legality’ in G Alexander, E Penlaver (eds), Property 
and Community (Oxford University Press 2010) 145. 
49 Harris (n 9) 221. 
50 PF Strawson, Individuals (Methuen & Co Ltd 1959) 97-98. 
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inalienable”.51 Therefore it seems wholly inconsistent to allow objects or 
resources, regardless of whether they are subject to a communal or 
individual personal-property claim, to be alienable. Only objects or 
resources that are subject to a fungible property claim should be 
transferrable in this way, and personal-property claims would need to 
become fungible property claims before any alienation of the subject of the 
claim could occur.   
 
Required Community Characteristics 
 
For a community successfully to establish a mutual self-interest 
common it must exhibit a number of characteristics. These characteristics 
allow the community to lay claim to the resource, and will also be 
instrumental in facilitating a group personhood claim.  
A significant and helpful contribution to the scholarship in this area can 
be found in the work of Professor Clarke who, after a survey of the literature 
(particular that of Professor Ostrom), suggests six important community 
characteristics: exclusion of non-members, mutual self-interest, 
homogeneity of interest, cohesive community, idiosyncratic regulation and 
the availability of sanctions.52 
 
(i) Exclusion of non-members 
 
The right to exclude others from the use of property that we consider to 
be ours is an important, if not the most important, characteristic of private 
property.53 It is also the hallmark of property rights stated in Blackstone’s 
classical view of property. A successful limited access common also relies 
on the ability of the community to exclude non-members of the community 
from using the resource. 
Clarke, by making reference to Ostrom, summarises that:  
 
The tragedy of the commons is averted by communal holding only 
if the resource is controlled by a group which is small and cohesive 
enough to permit members, at a sufficiently low cost, to 
communicate between themselves and devise and enforce rules 
regulating their own use of the resource. But group control depends 
                                                 
51 P Benson, ‘The Priority of Abstract Right, Constructivism, and the Possibility 
of Collective Rights in Hegel’s Philosophy’ (1991) 4 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 257, 283. 
52 Clarke (n 7). 
53 Rose (n 6) see chapter one generally. 
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on being able to keep out non-members, or, what amounts to the 
same thing, on all resource users being subject to the social norms 
of the group regulating use.54 
 
(ii) Mutual self-interest 
 
As alluded to during the previous discussion, there is the common 
misconception that communal property must be available to all. However, 
Clarke contends that a successful communal resource holding must be “just 
as private to the community as private property is to the private property 
owner.” 55  The common is governed by a mutual self-interest, not the 
greater public interest, and its survival is probably contingent on this. 
 
(iii) Homogeneity of interest 
 
The requirement for the homogeneity of interest runs to the core of 
Waldron’s assertions about the community dynamic. If many different, and 
sometimes incompatible, interests exist within the community it will be 
difficult to reach an agreement on the collective goal to be pursued. Studies 
have shown that disparate communities are not bound to fail, 56 but the 
likelihood of them doing so is far greater if homogeneity of interest cannot 
be achieved. 
  
(iv) Cohesive community  
 
Clarke suggests that the need for a cohesive community has a greater 
significance than the need for homogeneity of interest, as the cohesive 
community provides both the means and the method for promoting the 
mutual self-interest. 57  If the community are unable to act in a united 
fashion, and interact in a way that includes all members of the community, 
it will be unlikely that a homogeneous interest will be formulated and 
pursued. 
The importance of a cohesive community appears to have been 
acknowledged in English law in the instances where the community interest 
                                                 
54 Clarke (n 7) 328. 
55 Ibid 329. 
56 E Ostrom, ‘The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival and Performance 
of Common-Property Institutions’ in DW Bromley (ed), Making the Commons 
Work: Theory, Practice and Reality (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary 
Studies 1992) 293. 
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THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
37 
and entitlement to use land is recognised. For example, land may be 
designated as a town or village green if it can be shown that a significant 
number of the inhabitants of a locality or neighbourhood within a locality 
have used the land as of right for a period of twenty years. 58  Whilst 
‘locality’ has a technical legal meaning,59 Sullivan J has suggested that a 
neighbourhood must have a ‘sufficient degree of cohesiveness’. 60  The 
example of the town and village green as a mechanism for acknowledging 
communal rights over land will be examined in the second instalment of 
this two-article series. 
 
(v) Idiosyncratic regulation 
 
Communities that successfully establish mutual self-interest commons 
also develop a variety of regulations that meet the needs of their 
community. The precise rules that are developed will be unique to that 
particular community and may regulate who can use the resource, when 
they may use it and how. Crucially, these rules will be developed by the 
community itself and will be informed by the shared experience of its 
members; this is an important point to note, as the law does not create 
groups and they are not legal fictions. It is not objective factors, such as 
race, culture or language that makes a collection of individuals into a 
community or group, but rather subjective factors and a shared 
understanding. 61  Objective factors may be a good indication that the 
necessary shared understanding exists between the members of the group 
and that idiosyncratic regulation will develop, but this is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient condition. Only those with the subjective knowledge of the 
community will be able to initiate successful regulation of the group, and 
the subjective knowledge of the group does not necessarily flow from 
objective assessment.   
An example of idiosyncratic regulation that Ostrom provides is the 
Alanya inshore fishery. 62  Following a number of experiments in the 
allocation of fishing sites, the local cooperative devised a number of rules 
for the efficient and fair allocation of fishing sites among all licensed fishers 
                                                 
58 Commons Act 2006, s 15. 
59 ‘Locality’ is defined as an administrative district or area with legally significant 
boundaries in Paddico (267) Ltd v Kirklees Metropolitan Council [2011] EWHC 
(Ch) 1606 [97] (Vos J). 
60 R (Cheltenham Builders Ltd) v South Gloucestershire District Council [2003] 
EWHC (Admin) 2803 [85] (Sullivan J). 
61 McDonald (n 34) 218, 219. 
62 Ostrom (n 2) 17-20. 
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in Alanya. These rules included provisions that rotated fishers between 
fishing grounds, so that each had an equal chance of fishing the most 
prosperous sites. Ostrom notes that not only did these rules develop from 
within the group rather than being imposed from outside the group, it would 
have been impossible for an outside agency such as the state to achieve the 
same efficiency in the rules.63 Devising these rules required knowledge that 
could only be gained by fishing in the area for an extended period. The task 
of mapping the local fishing sites, the migration of the fish and the effect 
that fishing had on the migration could only be done by those with local 
knowledge and vast amounts of experience.  
Furthermore, Bromley also suggests that influences and rules that 
originate from outside the group may actually destroy the resource and the 
common-property regime. 64  In a similar example using fisheries, he 
suggests that governments often seek to modernise fishing practices by 
subsiding new technologies. The increase in fishing capability upsets 
institutional arrangements and leads to overfishing, yet many blame the 
common-property regime and not the introduction of alien fishing methods 
and technology. On the contrary, Bromley suggests that those outside the 
community will hail the introduction of the technology as a success, 
branding the institutional arrangements ‘primitive or quaint’.65 
It is possible that the internal idiosyncratic regulation does not even 
arise from a conscious, or democratic, decision-making process. The most 
prevalent way in which commons have historically come into being is 
through custom. The use of the resource may be governed by centuries-old 
understanding of entitlements between a community of users.  
 
(vi) Sanctions  
 
The requirement that the group has sanctions has two limbs. First, 
Ostrom notes that successful communities will adopt a system of mutual 
enforcement. For example, in the Alanya fishery the fishers themselves 
monitor the use of the agreed fishing locations, and the enforcement of the 
rules allocating their use. Cheating the rotation system and using a more 
prosperous site that one is not entitled to on a particular day would not go 
undetected by those who are entitled to use those sites; the fisher who is 
burdened by the cheat will take measures to protect his entitlement. The 
other fishers, who will be seeking to disincentive cheating so that their 
entitlement to fish on the prosperous sites is not interfered with, will support 
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him in the hope that there would be a reciprocity of support should they 
have need for it.66 
The second limb is that the ultimate sanction for non-compliance with 
the regulations is exclusion from the resource or from the community that 
uses the resource. The community polices itself, and those who are 
identified through the monitoring process as not willing to comply with the 
rules are expelled from the community. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This two-part article is concerned with justifying the recognition of the 
rights of a defined community to a natural resource, also known as a limited 
access common, and not a claim made the by public generally, which is an 
open access regimes. Despite the key feature of the limited access common 
being the exclusion from the resource of those individuals who fall outside 
of the community, there is a marked difference between the limited access 
common and the private property regime that it resembles: a true common-
property resource cannot be alienated at the expense of the future 
generation of users. 
In order to justify the limited access common, in the hope of protecting 
community use claims against claims of private individuals, the personality 
theory of property can be applied. For a community to have the requisite 
personality that can be projected into the external world, and establish a 
claim over natural resources, it must have a number of characteristics. The 
six descriptive characteristics provided above are by no means an 
exhaustive list of the characteristics that a community must possess in order 
successfully to initiate a common-property regime, and neither are they a 
prediction of the success of a common-property regime. 67  Indeed, the 
dominant message of Ostrom’s scholarship on this topic is one urging 
caution against believing that there is one analysis that fits all common 
property regimes.68 
However, the listed characteristics are a way of attaining the state of 
affairs that Waldron; they ensure that the interests of individuals in the 
mutual self-interest group will be no different from the collective interests 
                                                 
66 Ostrom (n 2) 20. 
67 Clarke (n 7) 329-31. 
68  See for example E Ostrom, ‘A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond 
Panaceas’ (2007) 104 (39) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
15181; E Ostrom, Robust Property Rights Institutions to Manage Local and Global 
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of the community, which is that the goals of the community should be 
pursued. The group characteristics listed above promote the required unity, 
and it becomes possible that the community possesses only one collective 
will.  It follows that there is no reason why this will, like the will of an 
individual, cannot be projected into the external world. 
The second instalment of this article will proceed to apply the 
personality theory of property to the limited number of community claims 
that are recognised in English law. The aim of the inquiry will be to 
establish whether community property claims are afforded the same 
protection as their private property counterparts that are usually justified by 
using the personhood perspective. 
 
 
